Vol. X, No. 25 HUMAN EVENTS June 24, 1953

APPEASEMENT A LA MODE

By FREDA UTLEY

THE "PEACE-LOVING" Mr. Nehru, whose concern for small or underprivileged Asiatic nations does not extend to those menaced by Soviet imperialism, has pronounced himself satisfied that the United Nations will be able to "handle" the South Koreans. This statement by our Indian mentor followed on his criticism of the United States for allowing Syngman Rhee to get out of hand and denounce the armistice which sacrifices his people on the altar of appeasement. No doubt Nehru is right in believing that Indian troops can now enter Korea without getting hurt. For, as a Chinese friend of mine remarked, on hearing that General Clark had warned the Republic of Korea that the U.N. would cut off food supplies, as well as ammunition, should it continue the fight for the liberation of its Northern countrymen: "Well, no doubt America will have little difficulty in defeating the *South* Koreans."

After three years of war and 135 thousand American casualties, not to speak of the two million South Korean soldiers and civilians who have been killed or wounded, we are ending up by coercing our friends instead of defeating our enemies. All the oceans of words with which columnists and commentators, together with the editorial writers of the *New York Times* and *Washington Post,* are flooding the press and the air, cannot wipe out the stain of America's first defeat.

JUN 29 '53

However hard the Alsop brothers try to convince us that we have "achieved the main purpose the American Government had in view", the fact remains that we have failed to chastise the aggressors; that the Chinese Communists remain in occupation of North Korea and control the whole country's industry and power supply; that the Soviet Union has defied the United Nations with impunity by openly proclaiming her aid to the aggressors; that we have no assurance even that the American and other allied prisoners in Communist hands will not suffer the same fate as the German soldiers whom we handed over to Russia in 1945, many of whom are today still in Soviet slave labor camps; that the anti-Communist prisoners in our hands are to be subjected to terrible mental pressures and threats to their families to make them return home, and relegated to the status of D.P.'s if they still refuse.

In a word, that the war fought at such huge cost in lives and money has achieved less than nothing. We may for the moment have "survived" and escaped disaster, which is all that the appeasers think we need to have done. But the outcome of the war leaves our enemies more confident, our friends disheartened, and the middle-of-the-roaders in-

Published weekly at 1835 K Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.
Copyright 1953 by HUMAN EVENTS, INC.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

clined to believe that there is little hope for those who choose our side in the struggle for the world.

Even Walter Lippmann, the noblest sophist of them all, finds it a bit difficult to convince his readers that "at long last the Korean war has been brought to an honorable and rational end". For although so many of our scribes seem to be intent on obscuring reality for political purposes, or simply because it is profitable to pander to the human desire for a happy ending, there are still a sufficient number of honest and intelligent journalists to ensure that the truth comes out. Certainly, in Washington at least, no one who reads David Lawrence's courageous column can fail to be aware that we are deserting a gallant ally in deference to a shortsighted political expediency dictated by Winston Churchill and our American appeasers.

DEAN ACHESON must be chuckling at the spectacle of a Republican Administration treating Syngman Rhee and his people in much the same fashion as he treated Chiang Kai-shek and the anti-Communist Chinese. Our former Secretary of State might even claim to have been more merciful in his treatment of China than his successors have been with regard to Korea. From the beginning, General Marshall and Dean Acheson endeavored to force the Chinese Nationalists to submit to Moscow without incurring the losses and sacrifices which a war of resistance entails. "Our Koreans" on the other hand were encouraged to fight, and to suffer the devastation of their country, in the confident hope that with mighty Americans fighting beside them they would be able to liberate and unite their country.

Now we tell them in effect that their sacrifices were in vain since this was never our military objective. Yet, in his June 7 letter to Syngman Rhee, President Eisenhower fails to explain why, if our objective was simply to push the Korean Communists back into North Korea, we did not stop fighting in October, 1950, when this task had been accomplished. Nor why the United Nations declared in November, 1950, that it would not settle for less than its long proclaimed objective of a united and peaceful Korea, and gave permission for General MacArthur to drive to the Yalu.

There is an ominous similarity between our past Chinese and present Korean policies. In December, 1945, and again a year later, President Truman told our Chinese allies that they must not attempt to suppress Communism and unify their country by "military means"; and that no American aid would be forthcoming unless and until they formed a coalition government with the Communists. On June 7, 1953, Eisenhower wrote to Syngman Rhee saying that he must give up any idea of "carrying on by warfare the struggle for the unification of Korea" and should instead "pursue this goal by political and other measures". He further warned the South Koreans that they would be regarded as "aggressors" should they attempt to liberate North Korea by force. Since it cannot be imagined even by the most fatuous optimist that Moscow or Peking will retreat under political or

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

moral pressures after having successfully stood their ground against America's armed might, Eisenhower's letter can easily be construed all over Asia as advice to come to terms with the Kremlin.

The deadly parallel is even more apparent when one recalls how General Marshall embargoed arms and ammunition to the Chinese Nationalists in 1946-7 when they were in a position to defeat the Communists with our aid. In Korea we not only failed to deliver arms to the Republic of Korea before it was attacked, we also failed to supply sufficient ammunition to our own soldiers after the Korean war began. And our American commanders in Korea, like Chiang Kai-shek before them, were forbidden to try to win the war and were stymied by prolonged truces. The peace at any price policy, begun by Truman in the summer of 1951 after he had recalled General MacArthur, has now been carried to its logical conclusion by the Eisenhower Administration.

The argument so dear to the hearts of the *New York Times* and others who speak for England, that we must defer to the wishes of our allies, is manifestly absurd. Who *are* our allies? The British who, although they have contributed some soldiers, have continued to trade with the enemy and have even transported his troops? The French who have given us no help and want us to liquidate the Korean war in order that we may assume their burdens in Indo-China? India which has contributed nothing but sympathy for the Communist side? Or the Republic of Korea which has held seventy per cent of the line, and which, in Eisenhower's own words, "has engaged all its resources, human and material, in a struggle which will go down in history as one of the epic struggles of our time"? By what logic can we consider it legitimate to dictate to those who have shared with us the heat and burden of the day, while deferring to those who have been our allies in little more than name?

WE HAVE SUFFERED a loss of national prestige so grave that it may make World War III inevitable. The Kremlin must now believe that it is at liberty to try the game again any time, anywhere in the world, with the assurance that it risks nothing worse than ending up where it started. It is as if in a poker game one player knew that he could play for the highest stakes with the assurance that if he wins he can take the pot, and that if he loses he will have to pay nothing. We still have more blue chips than the Kremlin, but we must lose in the long run if Moscow can continue to bid the limit, however poor its hand, because we refuse to risk anything. This is surely the meaning which the Kremlin will read into Eisenhower's statement, in his June 3 Report to the Nation, that "there is going to be no risk of a general war, because a modern war would be too horrible to contemplate".

Senator Knowland, alone among our legislators, has dared to tell the American people that our one hope of avoiding a Third World War is to risk it while we are still stronger than our enemies. But even he, no doubt in deference to Republican Party loyalty, has advised Syngman Rhee to give in.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lost allies are not merely lost. Sooner or later they are driven to join the other side. As the Korean Ambassador stated on "Meet the Press", May 31, every nation in Asia is waiting to see which side is the stronger. Can one doubt that Korea's fate will lead the "realists" to decide that some sort of accommodation with the Soviet Union is the only hope of saving their skins? The fact that we have sued for peace in a war which we could have won, rather than risk war with Russia, serves notice on the world that we lack the resolution to provide a banner to which all free men can repair. The forces of neutralism, or appeasement, in Europe, as in Asia, will inevitably gain strength.

Those who compare Panmunjom to Munich are also wrong. All that the much-abused Neville Chamberlain did was to agree to the self-determination of the people of the Sudetenland, which was a part of Czechoslovakia inhabited by Germans, which had formed part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and which would never have been awarded to the Czechs if Wilson's Fourteen Points had been adhered to. But at Panmunjom we have agreed to award to the aggressors a part of Korea inhabited exclusively by Koreans. What we are witnessing today can be more aptly compared to the secret Teheran and Yalta agreements which delivered the Poles to Russia and prepared the way for the Communist conquest of China, as well as of all Eastern Europe.

IN THE UNITED STATES, perhaps to an even greater degree than in other countries, foreign policy is determined by domestic politics. But, except in the very short run, is it really likely that the Republicans have won increased support by out-Achesoning Acheson in the Far East? Can the Democrats fail in the future to exploit to the full the argument that the Eisenhower Administration went even further along the line of appeasement than its predecessor? Already the Washington wags are saying that the Democrats started the Korean War and the Republicans lost it.

The blame cannot simply be placed on the President. Our fate lies not in the stars but in ourselves. Tremendous pressures have been exerted on the Administration from many sides to take the peace offered and let our credit go. The pressures are exerted by the financial interests who want to do business with Stalin's successors and the anti-anti-Communists who believe that the Soviets, although they have sinned, are basically virtuous or "progressive".

Abetting these appeasement influences are the British, confident that "there'll always be an England" so long as there are other nations to throw into the greedy jaws of the Communist Moloch. Last but not least, there are the good men of little faith who have persuaded themselves and the President that the Republican Party's only hope of survival is to give the people what they want at the moment, namely peace, at whatever cost to the future security of the United States.

But what will it profit the Republican Party to win the next election if America loses its soul, and prepares the way for its future defeat by betraying the faith hitherto reposed in us by those who prefer death to enslavement?

Additional Copies: 6—1.00; 10—1.50; 50—5.50; 100—10.00; 500—15.00; 1,000—25.00. Quotations for larger quantities on request.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

HUMAN EVENTS

FRANK C. HANIGHEN, *Editor* FRANK CHODOROV, *Associate Editor*

Vol. X, No. 25 Wednesday, June 24, 1953 Washington, D. C.

Supreme Court: The top judicial body of the country faced and successfully met a crisis in its history. The stay granted by Justice Douglas to the atom spies posed as big a problem to the Court as did the crucial steel decision of a year ago. On that occasion, President Truman scarcely served the cause of constitutionalism well. Last week, the Court met the test in no small part because of an assist from President Eisenhower.

When the action of Douglas drew an immediate challenge from Attorney General Brownell, President Eisenhower — so the story goes — got in touch with Chief Justice Vinson and urged that no time be lost in obtaining a full court opinion on the matter. (The close and friendly relationship between Ike and Vinson is well known here. It is recalled that when Eisenhower returned on a brief visit to Washington in the fall of 1951, Vinson was one of the few people in Washington with whom Eisenhower talked at length.) The Court, brought together by Vinson, promptly squelched the Douglas stay by a vote of 6 to 3. Legal experts comment that the majority could do no less.

...Y OF MIN...NESOTA JUN 29 '53

Opinion in the Capital generally reflects praise for the President, for his reasonable but humane explanation why he denied clemency to the two traitors. There is no little speculation that Ike resisted much subtle pressure for a pardon. (There was hysteria in the official family: such as, Ambassador Dillon in Paris cabling an extravagant warning of reactions in France.) But the President stood by his guns for the highest of motives and played a big role in bringing the whole unfortunate, protracted business to the close dictated by justice.

Taft: Some of the neurosis which struck the GOP when Taft first went to the hospital has subsided. The Ohioan returned to the Capital last week after treatment in New York and has been working in his office. Those close to him still disclaim any knowledge of what is the medical diagnosis. They say the Senator is still ill, but seems in better spirits than a fortnight ago.

We have talked with several persons who had paid business visits to the Senator in his office in the past few days. They describe him as looking "thin" and "frail", but mentally very active. Seated at his desk, he works on legislative matters and displays his usual keen interest in all foreign and domestic political developments.

What is of special interest is that the ailing Taft had a two-hour interview with the President after his return last week — evidence that he is "back on the job".

Four-Power Conference: If Malenkov is dead — so runs the current diplomatic gag in the Capital — how can you hold the four-power conference which Churchill has been urging? (Actually, there is no confirmation of reports that the new Soviet leader is dead; but along diplomatic row, these reports persist and are eagerly examined.) As a matter of fact, no matter who the Soviet dictator may be, the events in East Germany do suggest that now there is no valid reason why such a conference, including Russia, should be held.

The argument for such a conference, has been as follows: Whatever you might think of him and of Russia, Malenkov does represent the Communist world, including the satellites in Eastern Europe. Because of Soviet iron control, Malenkov could therefore deal for his part of the world, and in any settlement could promise to deliver. Therefore, we should at least hear what he has to say across the table.

Copyright 1953 by HUMAN EVENTS, INC.
Published weekly at 1835 K Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Today, it is pointed out, that argument has lost its force. The East German revolt offers evidence that Soviet Russia no longer has complete control of its most important satellite. Therefore, Malenkov (or whoever heads the Kremlin) cannot "deal", cannot "deliver", and it would therefore be a waste of time to sit down to table with him.

Revolt in Germany: The upsurge in Eastern Germany caught the State Department napping (as usual) and apparently rather peevish about a development which might really menace the Soviet system. As a matter of fact, well-informed circles here (particularly among the military) convincingly disclaim that our cloak-and-dagger outfits had any part in the commencement of the extraordinary riots, strikes and popular risings in the Russian zone of Germany. In the absence of any information to the contrary, it appears that the East German revolt was purely indigenous and perhaps wholly spontaneous.

This is bad: after all the whoopla about psychological warfare, we apparently did nothing. What is worse is that we apparently plan to continue doing nothing. There seems no action contemplated to exploit the trouble — perhaps grave trouble — of our Communist enemy. Foreign policy moves are not shaped by Ike and Dulles but by Truman-Acheson holdovers, led by C. D. Jackson, a Time-Life product, formerly in charge of Radio Free Europe, and Undersecretary of State "Beedle" Smith. RFE was guided, if not controlled, by the Central Intelligence Agency, of which General "Beedle" Smith was head. Smith now is Undersecretary of State and is known as the "boss" of the State Department. Today it is reported that Jackson and Smith are the ones who are behind the present appeasement policy and are urging Ike to yield to Churchill's demand for a conference with Malenkov. As Ike was reportedly heard to remark recently: "I don't seem to be getting the best advice."

Significant of really professional opinion on the events in Germany is the reaction of "diplomatic row" in Washington, the foreign embassies who benefit from dispatches from their home capitals. These sources wonder if the East German situation hasn't gone so far as to radically alter previous assumptions. For instance, it had been believed here that Russia would again offer to evacuate her troops from Germany (if the West would do the same) and to permit the two halves of Germany to unite. But, now, in view of the fact that she cannot trust her eastern puppets, will not the Kremlin back out of this offer?

Korea: Syngman Rhee may or may not have spoiled the chances for a truce. But, he seems to have pointed out a way by which America can get a better bargain for a truce settlement from the Reds. It's a way quite the opposite of the official prescription for getting a truce and a peace. The State Department has insisted that we give the Reds the most generous terms and in no way offend the latter by haggling or demanding a better deal — otherwise, the Reds would call off the whole matter.

When Rhee released the North Korean anti-Communist prisoners, the State Department showed great alarm and expressed fear that the Reds would cancel the negotiations. But, within 24 hours it was evident that the Reds had no such intention and word from their camp indicated they were prepared to conclude an armistice regardless of what Rhee had done or said. What was the lesson of this surprise? That the enemy very much wanted a truce on the terms indicated and is willing to yield on other points — such as the Rhee release of prisoners.

Many people here, especially on Capitol Hill, who initially applauded the idea of a truce now believe that the only way to achieve that end and to "bring the boys home" *permanently* is to "talk tough and bargain hard" with Soviet Russia. Recent events suggest that the Kremlin may now be in a mood to make concessions which would have seemed astonishing a month ago.

Of course, the Reds have requested that General Mark Clark hunt down and recapture the Koreans liberated by Rhee. This is taken with a grain of salt. If it's just an argument, our negotiators are in position to retort that the enemy took a similar course as Rhee back in February, 1951. In that month, the North Korean Communist Government released about 40,000 prisoners they held, after "brain-washing" them and incorporated them in the Red Army. The whole matter would be reduced to absurdity

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

if the U.S. were to demand that the Red Government collect and put back in prisoner camps those Koreans released by the Reds in 1951.

Bricker Amendment: The internationalists in the State Department and White House developed a bad state of nerves from the news from Wisconsin. In that state, the GOP organization censured Senator Wiley for his opposition to the Bricker Amendment — the measure introduced by the junior Ohio Senator to protect American sovereignty from the encroachment of the United Nations and Treaty Law. As a matter of fact, the resolution of the Wisconsin convention was but a surface manifestation of the deep feeling of antagonism against Wiley, who has now come to represent for the people of Wisconsin the internationalism of the new Administration. It is a commonplace now that Wiley has lost his former following and now depends on Democrats and socialists for sympathy and support.

(It is now believed that Wiley has come to recognize his unpopularity in his own state and has relinquished ideas of running for re-election in '56. It is thought — although no definite word is as yet available — that Wiley now has set his sights on a diplomatic or UN post, a safe haven of retirement from his Senate seat.)

Meanwhile, in the Capital, the State Department's jitters prompted officials to seek interviews with Bricker in the hope that they could persuade him to modify his phraseology in the proposed amendment. So far, "Honest" John has shown little signs of compromise and attempts to influence him have dropped off.

Supporters of the Bricker measure are happy over the popularity generated by the drive to pass it and particularly by Hon. Frank Holman's fine educational campaign. However, some show concern over the failure to line up definitely a majority of the Senate. Too many of these legislators are still listed as "uncertain". It is believed that a political apparatus should be created to bring pressure on those Senators who still cannot make up their minds.

Interest Rates: Mr. Frederick W. Ecker, President of Metropolitan Insurance Company, stated, according to the *Wall Street Journal* (June 22), that his company's new investments in securities yield an average of 4 per cent, as against 3.6 per cent a year ago. He predicted that the rates will reach a higher level; he ought to know, because as President of a great financial institution he ought to know about the demand for money. He is bullish.

That should be a good omen for industry, and the public as a whole. High interest rates simply indicate that there is a demand for capital. A demand for capital means that there is a demand for the goods made with capital; also, it means that there is a demand for labor to use this capital in the manufacture of the goods wanted. All of this is to the good.

However, when industry needs capital it competes with the government, which is always in the market for money that might become industrial capital. Its bonds are always maturing. The government feels the pinch of this competition, as witness the increasing rates on its re-issues. So, what is good for the public is not good for the government, and vice versa.

Mr. Ecker also reports that the Metropolitan has less money to lend than it had a year ago. Why? Well, a year ago it received a wad of dollars from the government for bonds which matured; the company, says the newspaper, sold the bonds "in anticipation of higher money rates". The inference is that the company put the money it got from the government into industrial securities and mortgages, which paid higher interest rates, until the government should get around to meeting these yields. The Metropolitan was not alone in doing that sensible thing; Tom, Dick and Harry have been investing the proceeds of their maturing "savings" bonds in more profitable securities.

Though the public should be thankful for higher interest rates, in that this fact represents a more prosperous economy, the fact is that the consequent fiscal headache of the government must be shared by the public. For, the headache is passed on to the public via higher taxes and inflationary measures.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

North From Malaya by William O. Douglas. New York: Doubleday and Company. $3.95. Reviewed by William Henry Chamberlin.

Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas is one of the hardiest survivors of a diminished band of New Deal spellbinders and phrasemakers. He has taken up where Henry (Quart of Milk) Wallace, now very much in political oblivion, left off.

Typical of the balanced judgment of Mr. Douglas is his description of the United States as living under a "black silence of fear" — at a time when one can scarcely open a newspaper without reading a speech by someone denouncing Senator McCarthy and when anyone can go into a bookstore and take his pick among scores of books telling in great detail how Americans are afraid to call their souls their own. He brings the same equipment — bumbling good will, vague sentimental sympathy for the under-privileged, an instinctive prejudice in favor of revolution and against established conservative institutions — to bear on the problems of southeast Asia.

Some of the Justice's reporting is good; he is an outdoor man and a man of action and he evidently went into some of the numerous trouble spots of the area which he visited. He conveys a feeling of the terror created by Chinese guerrillas in Malaya, of the frustrating situation in Indo-China, where the front is everywhere and nowhere and using regular troops against Ho Chi Minh's elusive Communist guerrillas is, in the apt phrase of a French officer, like trying to kill a mosquito with a sledgehammer.

But as an adviser on foreign affairs Justice Douglas is about as muddled and confused as they come. Indeed he is so muddled and confused that he frequently contradicts himself or recommends measures which are clearly self-contradictory. So, in one of his more realistic moments, he writes: "Today no one can doubt that Red China is subservient to Soviet influence and junior partner in Sino-Soviet affairs. . . . China has lost her independence as a result of the Communist revolution. No one knows it better than the Asians."

But in other places he depicts Red China as an inspiration to other Asiatic peoples. He suggests, without any convincing evidence, that "Red China seemed anxious to talk peace with the West in September, 1950". And he urges us to try to reach a political settlement with the very regime which he describes as "subservient to Soviet influence" and as having lost its independence.

It is even harder to make coherent sense out of the Justice's recommendations for American policy in Indo-China. He urges us to "throw our weight behind an *anti-French*, non-Communist, truly independent regime". Yet his own account of the military situation in Indo-China indicates that such a regime would have extremely little chance of survival. With all the faults that may be charged against their colonial policy, the French are an indispensable element in the struggle against Communism in Indo-China; and one could scarcely imagine French soldiers continuing to die for a regime that would be "anti-French".

Perhaps the silliest statement in the book is the assertion: "The next great, cold war will be between India and Russia." The idea of India, under Nehru's leadership, waging any kind of war against the Soviet Union, in view of its consistent record of appeasement in the Korean conflict, is almost laughable. Equally questionable are the author's eulogies of Burma's "leftist" Prime Minister, U Nu, whose published writings include a recommendation to form a single party of Leftists "to teach the Marxist-Lenin creed, to discuss and propagate its doctrines".

Fuzzyminded "leftist" good will is not an adequate guide for American policy in Asia, or anywhere else.

Entered as second class matter at the Post Office, Washington, D. C. Quotation up to a paragraph is permitted with credit to HUMAN EVENTS. For reproduction or more extensive quotation address requests to HUMAN EVENTS, 1835 K Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Trial Subscription, three months for $3. Six months, $5.50. One year, $10. Two years, $18. First class mail, one year, $11.00; six months, $6.00. Domestic airmail (including APO and FPO) one year, $12.00; foreign (regular mail) one year, $11. Foreign airmail rates on request. Please remit in U.S.A. DOLLARS. Allow two weeks for new subscription or change of address to become effective.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED